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The voluminous literature on the privatization of Russian industry overlooks, almost com-
pletely, the story of enterprise land rights – a story that does not jibe well with the standard 
narrative of post-Soviet reform. This paper explains the path that has led to significant in-
ter-regional variation in the ownership status of lands underneath urban industrial enter-
prises. It then introduces unique data from a survey of 359 large industrial firms across 
several dozen of Russia’s largest cities to explore why some firms have purchased their 
production plots whereas others continue to lease or hold these lands under the old Soviet 
system of tenure. In exploring both inter-regional and inter-firm variation in land rights, we 
find evidence consistent with the proposition that the decisions of regional officials and 
(the managers and owners of) firms are guided by securing rights over real estate rents.  
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The ownership of industrial land in Russian cities:  







Yritysten yksityistämistä Venäjällä käsittelevässä runsaassa kirjallisuudessa on liki täydel-
lisesti jätetty huomiotta teollisuusyritysten käyttämän maan yksityistäminen. Tässä tutki-
muksessa kuvaillaan teollisuusyritysten maanomistusoloissa ilmeneviä merkittäviä alueel-
lisia eroja. Lisäksi tutkimuksessa käytetään hyväksi ainutlaatuista 359 teollisuusryityksen 
haastatteluaineistoa selitettäessä miksi jotkut yritykset ovat ostaneet maan itselleen ja miksi 
toiset vuokraavat sen paikallishallinnolta tai jatkavat neuvostoaikaista hallintaoikeussopi-
musta. Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että niin paikallishallinnon kuin yritystenkin päätöksiä 
maanomistusolojen järjestämisessä ohjaa pyrkimys hallita tontilla sijaitsevien kiinteistöjen 
vuokratuottoja. 
 
Asiasanat: kaupunkien maankäyttö, omistusoikeus, Venäjä 
JEL: K11, L6, P26, P31, R33 
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1  Introduction 
 
The voluminous literature on the privatization of Russian industry overlooks, almost com-
pletely, the story of enterprise land rights – a story that does not jibe well with the standard 
narrative of post-Soviet reform. The reputedly rapid privatization of the Yeltsin era was 
initiated without any changes being made to the tenure status of the land on which enter-
prises sat. And the Putin years, during which the government’s commitment to privatiza-
tion was frequently described as having waned, witnessed a wave of sell-offs of state-
owned lands to private industry. Despite land accounting for a substantial share of the 
market value of many privatized firms and the potentially adverse consequences of split-
ting rights over capital and contiguous land, this story has not been well publicized. None 
of the major empirical studies evaluating the effects of industrial privatization in Russia, 
for instance, account for ownership rights over land.1
Rights to industrial land are central to the evolution of Russian cities. The Soviet 
economic model emphasized rapid urbanization and built up population centers whose spa-
tial distribution came to look little like those elsewhere in the world. Because of the sup-
pression of markets and the priorities of planners, a disproportionately large share of urban 
land was given over to industry (Bertaud and Renaud, 1997; Stanilov, 2007). Though this 
pattern persisted into the post-Soviet era (Buckley and Mini, 2000; Bertaud and Malpezzi, 
2003; Bertaud, 2004), evidence has been accumulating that as the share of industry in the 
economy declines and as state control over valuable urban land is weakening, the alloca-
tion of space across different economic uses is changing (Makharova and Molodikova, 
2007; Molodikova and Makhrova, 2007). 
    
A cursory study of enterprise land rights in Russian cities reveals a patchwork 
quilt of patterns. Some territorial subjects have done much to liberalize land rights and al-
location mechanisms; others, in spite of apparent pressure from the federal government, 
have proceeded much more slowly.  Within territorial subjects, and even within single cit-
ies, we observe a great deal of variation in the tenure status of enterprise land. Some firms 
have purchased and now own the land on which they sit; some lease and make regular 
rental payments to government agencies; and yet others continue to occupy their plots un-
                                                 
1 For example, see any of the studies referenced in the widely-cited literature review of Estrin et al. (2009). 
Sources noteworthy for the mention they give to the ownership of urban industrial land include Boycko et al. 
(1995), Heller (1998) and McKinsey Global Institute (1999).   William Pyle 
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der the old Soviet-era legal framework. This article seeks to describe and explain both the 
macro- (i.e., inter-regional) and micro-level (inter-firm) variation in land rights.  
Answering why some regions and firms have privatized their industrial plots and 
others have not is, we believe, critical to understanding the trajectory of Russia’s post-
communist development. Public ownership of land deprives firms of both an asset that 
could be used as collateral to secure external financing and an ability to generate restruc-
turing funds from the sale or lease of any excess land. Perhaps more notably, the split of 
ownership rights over complementary assets – land and capital – may slow enterprise re-
structuring given the potential for rent-seeking officials to translate control rights into op-
portunities to enrich themselves and/or pursue political objectives. As Boycko et al. (1995) 
cautioned early in the reform process, “The vagueness of [land] lease contracts offer[s] in-
dividual bureaucrats both power over businesses and a steady source of income from 
bribes … [They may use their] control over land to influence privatized industrial firms, 
insisting that they continue to pay for social services and main employment.”  These possi-
bilities have the potential to shorten the effective time horizons of enterprise owners, dis-
couraging them from making potentially productive long-term investments. 
Following from the logic that rights to urban industrial land offer access to a 
stream of rents, we seek to understand regional and firm-level variation in those rights in 
terms of variation in the magnitude of those potential rents.  In regions with more valuable 
real estate, that is, we would expect greater official resistance to the sale of land to private 
enterprise. Furthermore, conditional on regional policy governing land privatization, we 
would expect firms sitting on more valuable real estate to purchase their plots so as  to se-
cure rights over the rents that those plots generate. Indeed, this is exactly what we find. 
Regions that are most urbanized and developed (as measured by urbanization rates and per 
capita income) – i.e., regions that we would expect have the highest urban land values – 
have witnessed the slowest privatization of industrial lands. And controlling for regional 
policy, urban industrial firms with more attractive real estate features have been more apt 
to assume ownership over their primary production plots. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a brief history of federal pol-
icy governing industrial land privatization in Russia over the past two decades. Section 3 
highlights macro-level trends and inter-regional differences in tenure status. Section 4 in-
troduces a unique survey of large industrial enterprises to explore the firm-level determi-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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nants of land plot privatization. Section 5 uses the survey to make a fuller case as to the 
validity of assumptions that guide the analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  Land policies  
 
Transfer of ownership of non-agricultural commercial lands to the firms that use them was 
an important step in the transformation of property rights in much of the post-communist 
world.2
Russia’s 1993 Constitution did lay out the right to private land ownership. But 
subsequent efforts to give specific form to that language – including Presidential Decrees, 
chapters in the Civil Code enacted in 1994 and 1995, and disparate pieces of legislation – 
produced a body of law that was seen as “incomplete … and sometimes ambiguous” (Ka-
ganova and O’Leary, 1997).
 Many of the Central and East European countries simultaneously privatized enter-
prise capital and land, often transferring the latter at a nominal fee. Russia followed a dif-
ferent path. The initial measures governing the corporatization and privatization of Rus-
sia’s state enterprises were applied only to equipment, buildings and other structures. Land 
plots remained state-owned. A fundamental principle of market economies that the owner-
ship of surface objects derives from ownership of the land underneath (superficies solo 
cedit) was thus ignored. Expediency, not ignorance nor special Russian sensitivities to land 
tenure issues, seems to have been the main motive. The potential complexities of resolving 
property boundaries and the perceived need to develop parallel legislation on title registra-
tion and a land cadastre struck the architects of Russia’s privatization program as poten-
tially too time consuming given the priority they placed, largely for political reasons, on 
speed. 
3
                                                 
2 This section draws closely on material presented in Khakhalin and Pyle (2009). 
 Nevertheless, between 1994 and 1997, an estimated 34.5 
thousand hectares, across roughly fifty Russian regions, were transferred to private enter-
prises. In May 1997, a new presidential decree granted regional administrations near full 
discretion in establishing land sale prices. Thereafter, land prices began to vary signifi-
cantly across Russia’s territorial subjects. With prohibitively high prices in many regions, 
3 Presidential Decree 1535, issued in July 1994, spelled out procedures for acquiring the lands underneath 
privatized, non-agricultural enterprises. In conjunction with a 1995 decree that reduced the purchase price 
of enterprise-occupied land, it paved the way for a number of privatized enterprises to take ownership of 
their land plots. William Pyle 
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the pace of enterprise land privatization decreased dramatically, with many large cities re-
maining committed to a regime of continued state allocation and ownership (Kaganova, 
1998; Limonov et al., 2001).  Since local administrations were given greater control to set 
lease rates on state-owned land than tax rates on enterprise-owned land, they had an incen-
tive to make land privatization procedures complex, expensive and time consuming. In 32 
regions, land privatization was banned either by laws that contradicted federal legislation, 
by popular referenda, or by provisions added to the region’s constitution.  In Moscow, the 
city Duma passed a resolution that land plots occupied by privatized enterprises could be 
leased but not sold. 
Most privatized enterprises initially held the lands they occupied under the right 
of permanent (perpetual) use, a Soviet-era form of land tenure, which granted its holder a 
right to use and build on a parcel but not to dispose of it through, for instance, sale to an-
other party. This form of land tenure, re-enumerated in the Russian Civil Code of 1995, 
was characterized as permanent only because a termination date was not specified. If the 
government did dispossess a permanent use holder of its lands, it faced a legal obligation to 
provide compensation at market value. Many Russian enterprises continue to this day to 
hold their land under permanent (perpetual) use rights; requiring them to pay a tax, deter-
mined by the land’s assigned cadastral value, at the same rate as land owners.  
A breakthrough in the enterprise land privatization process occurred in 2001 when 
the Putin administration successfully pushed through the Duma the Russian Federation 
Land Code. Designed to reinvigorate the process begun in the mid-1990s, it laid out 
mechanisms to force divestiture of state lands under privately owned structures and to 
unify titles to land and buildings. For instance, it called for the ownership of real estate ob-
jects to henceforth follow ownership of the attached land plot; it granted exclusive right to 
purchase or lease state-owned land to the owner of the attached real estate object; it gave to 
private owners of buildings on land plots owned by other private parties the pre-emptive 
right to purchase the land; and it prohibited the future privatization of real estate objects 
without the concurrent privatization of the attached plot (Remington, 2002; Survey of 
Land, 2006).  
Perhaps most notably, the Land Code sought to bring an end to the rights of per-
manent (perpetual) land use by requiring private enterprises to convert from the Soviet-era 
form of land tenure to rights of ownership or lease by January 1, 2004. Further, the upper 
bound limiting the price that regional administrations could charge for enterprise land was BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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reduced and their land sale legislation was to be brought into line with federal law. Al-
though this legislative push did lead to an increase in the re-registration of enterprise land 
rights in many regions, its impact was not as great as anticipated. In an effective capitula-
tion to the resistance the new provisions were encountering, the original deadline for con-
verting rights of permanent use was first pushed back two years to 2006, and then again 
later to 2008. The deadline now is January 1, 2012. 
The response of sub-federal jurisdictions to the 2001 Land Code has varied tre-
mendously. In some municipalities, a substantial share of land – including parcels that 
were unimproved and those under privatized enterprises – has now been sold off to the pri-
vate sector; in others, such as Moscow, the municipal government retains an effective 
ownership monopoly (Kisunko and Coolidge, 2007; Survey of Land, 2006). More recently, 
the long-awaited Federal Law 212, the so-called “Major Amendments to Land Privatiza-
tion Legislation” enacted in July 2007, seemed to hold out the promise of resolving, once 
and for all, ambiguities surrounding the ownership of enterprise land. But many local ad-
ministrations continue to put up resistance. Although Law 212 laid out a new mechanism 
for establishing the purchase price of plots, requiring that it not exceed 2.5% of the cadas-
tral value (20% in Moscow and St. Petersburg), evidence suggests that some regions re-
sponded by rather capriciously increasing cadastral values so as to discourage land pur-
chases. Regional and municipal governments have also maintained an array of formal and 




3  Patterns of ownership at the macro level 
 
In the context of Russia’s entire landmass, urban industrial land may appear to be rather 
unimportant. As shown in Figure 1, the categories recognized by Russian law, forests and 
agricultural lands account for nearly ninety percent of the entire land stock. Settlements  
                                                 
4 One recent analysis suggests that the inability to access land on transparent terms constitutes as big an ob-
stacle to business development in Russia as anywhere in the world (Muir and Shen, 2005). And among Rus-
sian enterprises that have direct experience with them, difficulties in acquiring land are more problematic 
than problems with bribery, the courts or access to finance, all matters that tend to receive more attention 
(Survey of Land, 2006). Similar results have been found in research focusing on the barriers to small busi-
nesses development (Zhuravskaya et al., 2005). William Pyle 
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(земли поселений), which constitute just over one percent of Russian lands, or 19.5 million 
hectares, include 7.9 million hectares of urban space (городские населенные пункты) in 
Russia’s largest cities and towns.5 The 16.7 million hectares of industrial lands outside of 
settlements represent another legal category of relevance to our study.6
The reforms set in motion over the past two decades have been such that land in 
settlements, as well as industrial and agricultural lands, is now divided between those held 
by private parties – both firms (юридические лица) and individuals (физические лица) – 
and those held by the state and municipalities. According to the most recent data, 123.5 
million hectares, or 8.5% of all Russian land is now held privately. Within urban settle-
ments, firms now own 247.8 thousand hectares compared to 7108.0 thousand held by the 
state and municipalities. On industrial lands outside of settlements, 122.7 thousand hec-
tares are in the hands of firms, whereas state and municipalities continue to own 16,635.3 
thousand hectares.
   
7
As suggested in the previous section, the national-level data mask a great deal of 
variation in the pace of non-agricultural land privatization across regions within Russia. 
Comprehensive data on land ownership at the level of Russia’s eighty-plus territorial sub-
jects is hard to come by. The most complete source that we have uncovered was made 
available on a website maintained by the Federal Agency for the Real Estate Cadastre 
 Since the passage of the 2001 Land Law, this relationship between pri-
vate and state lands has changed dramatically; the ratio of the former to the latter has 
grown at roughly annual average rates of 18% and 21% in urban settlements and on indus-
trial lands outside of settlements, respectively.   Indeed, looking at enterprise land alone, 
the past decade could be described as one of rapid privatization, a characterization much at 
odds with the standard story that in Putin’s Russia, privatization “stalled” and the share of 
Russia’s GDP produced by private enterprise fell (Aslund, 2007, 251). Figure 2 captures 
the six-fold increase from 2001 to 2010 of land ownership by enterprises in urban settle-
ments and industrial lands outside of settlements. 
                                                 
5 The precise definition of urban settlement varies by territorial subject. 
6 Formally, this category covers lands outside of population centers designated for industry, energy, transport, 
communications, broadcasting, as well as lands for space-related activities, defense and security and other 
special purposes. For purposes of brevity, we will refer to this category as industrial land outside of settle-
ments. 
7 Individuals own 578.4 thousand hectares in settlements, which is almost exclusively used for agricultural 
purposes; individuals own 17.8 thousand hectares on land legally designated as industrial. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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(Roskadastr).8 In March 2009, the agency was subsumed by the Federal Service for Regis-
tration, Cadastre and Cartography (Rosreestr). Of the 7875.5 thousand hectares of land in 
urban settlements, the Roskadastr data designated roughly 45% (3512.2 thousand hectares) 
as residential-commercial-industrial land.9 Of Moscow’s 109.1 thousand hectares, for in-
stance, roughly 77% was so described, as were half of St. Petersburg’s 139.9 thousand hec-
tares.10
In the absence of any indicators that describe the uses of land more finely, we in-
terpret the ratio of urban residential-commercial-industrial land owned by enterprises and 
that owned by government entities as a good proxy for the pace and extent of urban indus-
trial land privatization in a particular region.  For Russia as a whole, as well as for the Cen-
tral Federal District alone, this urban industrial land ownership index is 3.7%.
  
11
As noted above, sub-federal governments have taken very different approaches to 
the privatization of industrial land on their territory.  What might account for this varia-
tion? If public officials view control rights over land as a means to access a stream of rents, 
we might expect the resistance to federal efforts to unifying ownership rights over enter-
  Figure 3 
illustrates variation in this index across federal districts; the range spans from a high of 
4.9% in the Northwest to a low of 1.1% in the Far East. Further illustrating the variation 
across regions, Table 1 lists each of the twenty “progressive” territorial subjects whose ur-
ban industrial land ownership index exceeds the national average.  As an additional proxy 
for urban industrial land privatization, we look at industrial lands outside of population set-
tlements and calculate the ratio between that owned by enterprises and that by government 
entities (see column 4 of Table 1).   For the RSFSR, this measure is 4.4%, or 67.5 thousand 
of 1526.5 thousand hectares; across regions, the correlation between it and our preferred 
urban industrial land ownership index is 0.778. In the final column of Table 1, we list the 
number of enterprises from the region that participated in the survey whose results we dis-
cuss below.  
                                                 
8 The website with the comprehensive regional data was at http://www.kadastr.ru/available_land_2008/. Af-
ter Roskadastr was subsumed by Rosreestr, the website was no longer available. 
9 Formally, Roskadastr’s designation encompasses “lands for residential and commercial structures as well 
lands for industry, transport and communications” (земли жилой, общественно-деловой застройки, земли 
промышленности и общего пользования, а также транспорта, связи и инженерных коммуникаций, 
земли иного специального назначения). 
10 Within the Russian capital, after all, a good amount of land is given over to parks and largely un-developed 
green spaces; within the city limits of St. Petersburg, roughly 20,000 hectares is designated as arable agricul-
tural land. William Pyle 
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prise land and capital to have been resisted most where the potential rents from public land 
ownership are greatest – i.e., where land is most valuable.  
In the absence of a well-developed land market that provides reliable price infor-
mation, we must engage in a bit of reasoned speculation as to the factors that explain dif-
ferences in land values across regions. We could reasonably expect, for instance, that they 
relate to urbanization and development. Proximity to more amenities and market opportu-
nities, that is, make urban real estate generally more valuable than land outside of cities. In 
a related manner, higher regional per capita income should be associated with higher land 
values by increasing demand for urban retail space and housing. We might thus expect re-
gional urbanization rates and higher per capita income to increase the economic cost, in 
terms of foregone rents, to public officials of relinquishing control rights over land.  
There may be political costs to consider as well.  Inhibiting the privatization of 
industrial land will be more of a risk for officials in regions in which the industrial sector is 
relatively large and in which the politicians are particularly sensitive to social demands. 
We might thus anticipate finding more privatization where industry and construction repre-
sent a larger share of regional output and where the local political process is more trans-
parent and democratic.  
We would expect our index of urban industrial land privatization to be higher in 
those regions in which the political and economic costs to divesting control are low. We 
observe in Figures 5a that our urban industrial land privatization index was strongly and 
inversely related to measures of regional per capita income in 1995. Figure 5b, however, 
suggests that there does not appear to be the hypothesized negative relationship between 
the urbanization rate and industrial land privatization. Instead, when not controlling for 
other factors, the relationship is weakly positive. Figure 5c demonstrates the anticipated 
positive relationship between the index of urban industrial land privatization and the share 
of regional output produced by industry and construction. And finally, Figure 5d highlights 
a strong relationship between a well-known regional democracy index and industrial land 
privatization. 
In Table 2, we present regression results from a simple OLS model in which we 
simultaneously control for these different variables.  We take regional data on per capita  
                                                                                                                                                    
11 Within the Central District alone, the urban industrial land privatization index ranged from 0.2% in the city 
of Moscow to 24.2% in Belgorod. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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income and urbanization from 1995, a year after a Presidential Decree first called for en-
terprise land to be included in the general privatization program. In the absence of data on 
regional industrial structure from 1995, we use the percentage of regional output accounted 
for by industry and construction in 2000 under an assumption that this ratio would be rela-
tively sticky across time. Finally, we enter separately three well-known measures of re-
gional political variation. Data on transparency of the regional government are from “Me-
dia-Soyuz,” an independent association of Russian journalists (Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya, 2004); a variable capturing the scope of regional democracy comes from the 
Carnegie Center Moscow (Petrov, 2001); finally, an alternate measure of regional democ-
racy comes from Zubov (http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml).  
The results conform closely to expectations. When controlling for other regional 
variables, the urbanization rate is no longer positively related to the privatization of indus-
trial land; indeed, in two of the specifications, the relationship is both negative and statisti-
cally significant. Gross regional product per capita is inversely related to the land privatiza-
tion index at the 1% level across all three specifications. The share of regional output con-
tributed by the industrial and construction sectors has the predicted relationship to the rate 
of industrial land privatization; again, the result is significant at the 1% level in all three 
specifications. Finally, our various measures of political openness are all positively corre-
lated with land privatization. In sum, our findings support the theory that privatization 
should have proceeded most quickly in those regions where we would expect to observe 
lower economic and political costs to divest their control rights over urban industrial land. 
 
 
4  A micro-level perspective on plot tenure status 
 
4.1  Survey of large, urban, industrial firms 
 
Prior research has shown that despite a uniform federal policy, regions have differed 
greatly with respect to how accommodating they have been of firms’ attempts to privatize 
their plots. Regional officials have effectively been able to manipulate the “price” for pri-
vatizing a hectare of urban land. When they have been given the discretion, they have done 
so explicitly and directly (Kisunko and Coolidge, 2007). At other times, when their policy 
autonomy has been more circumscribed, some tinkered with the price indirectly by rather William Pyle 
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capriciously raising the cadastral values that serve as the basis for a plot’s price (Khakhalin 
and Pyle, 2009). They also have been able to raise prices implicitly by putting various bu-
reaucratic obstacles in the way of firms. Regardless of the mechanisms used, the regional 
variation in the price – a function of the structural and political factors highlighted above 
and captured as the inverse of our industrial land privatization index – can be seen as ex-
ogenous to the decisions of individual firms. Each firm, that is, takes regional policy as 
given and pursues its interest with respect to land tenure status accordingly. In regions 
where the land index is high, firms confront a low price for privatizing land; and vice 
versa. A firm’s choice to privatize its plot should reflect this “regional price.” But we 
would presume that it will also reflect firm and plot-specific characteristics.  
To understand the determinants of land privatization at the firm level, we collabo-
rated with Moscow’s Levada Centre to design and administer a survey of 359 large, urban 
industrial enterprises in the fall of 2009.12
Respondents answered general questions regarding their firm as well as those spe-
cifically addressing land-related issues. A series of questions addressed the firm’s primary 
production plot, with separate blocks designed for plots of different tenure status – i.e., pri-
vate, leased, or permanent (perpetual) use. Another series of questions asked about up to 
three additional plots attached to the firm at the time of the survey. One more block fo-
cused on plots that had been seized or sold in the recent past. Finally, respondents an-
swered a series of questions regarding the development of the land market in their regions. 
  Just under one fifth of the firms were in either 
Moscow or St. Petersburg, Russia’s two largest cities.   The rest were distributed relatively 
equally across cities (each a capital of a territorial subject) of three different size ranges: 1 
to 3 million; .5 million to 1 million; and .25 to .5 million.  In all, the respondents repre-
sented 53 cities and territorial subjects; 153 firms were located in the “progressive” regions 
noted in Table 1 (see column five). 
Of survey respondents, 172 own their primary production plot; 131 lease and 56 
hold it in perpetual use rights. Table 3 presents characteristics of the various enterprises 
and their primary production plots by land tenure status.  Before highlighting differences, it 
is worth highlighting similarities across plots of different tenure status. First, a high per-
                                                 
12 Pilot surveys were administered in the summer of 2009. Of those firms contacted to participate in the sur-
vey, 429 refused categorically; 308 did not refuse outright but did not end up participating for one reason or 
another (e.g., the surveying organization had some difficulty in settling on a mutually convenient time); at 42 
firms, the necessary respondent was absent (e.g., due to illness or vacation); finally, 458 did not complete the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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centage had office buildings on them, whereas social infrastructure (e.g., apartments, med-
ical centers and educational facilities) and commercial space (e.g., stores and markets) 
were less common, although by no means rare.13
Several differences strike us as noteworthy. Firms whose plot did not include so-
cial infrastructure (e.g., apartments, medical centers and educational facilities) at the time 
at which they were privatized were less likely to have privatized their land and more likely 
to still hold it under perpetual use rights. Firms that continue to operate under Soviet era 
land tenure rules were more likely to have much larger plots. Moscow is a clear outlier 
with respect to land tenure; relative to firms elsewhere, those in the capital were more 
likely to lease their land and less likely to hold it privately or under perpetual use rights. 
Finally, the ownership profile of firms varies across land tenure status. For instance, for-
eigners seem to play a relatively small role and the labor collective a relatively large role in 
firms that hold their plots under perpetual use rights. 
 At the time of the enterprises’ privatiza-
tion, roughly 80 percent of the plots were attached to the enterprise; the others were ac-
quired after the firm’s privatization.  Finally, firms in all three groups experienced, on av-
erage, significant employment declines since having been privatized.  
As per our earlier discussion, we find that most enterprise privatizations pre-dated 
privatization of their primary production plot by a number of years. Figure 6 lays out how 
most of the surveyed enterprises that owned their plots at the time of the survey were pri-
vatized by 1994, whereas most of their plots were privatized after 2001.  The median time 
period between the two privatizations was six years. A similar relationship emerges if we 
restrict our observation to those plots that were attached to the enterprise at the time of its 
privatization. 
Among the private plots, two-thirds were held in perpetual use prior to privatiza-
tion, with the remainder having been leased. The transition from lease-holding to private 
                                                                                                                                                    
survey because they did not make it through the filtering questions that related to their sector, ownership 
status, year of privatization and/or employment size.  
13 In the early 1990s, all firms over 10,000 employees offered housing as did roughly one-third of those with 
less than 500 employees. Further, some 70% of large and medium-sized enterprises offered medical services 
while over half provided day care. Many of these services were available to local residents and not just en-
terprise employees. Responding to a push from federal legislation, many of these social assets were taken 
over by municipalities in the mid-1990s. The average firm in a survey of several hundred large industrial 
enterprises had by 2003 divested 75% of its housing and 86% of its day care capacity (Juurikkala and Laza-
reva, 2006).   William Pyle 
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ownership became more common after 2001.14  To purchase the plots, 67 (46.2%) paid a 
percentage of cadastral value to purchase the plot (an average rate of 5.6%, median re-
sponse of 2.5%); 41 (28.3%) paid the full cadastral value; and 20 (13.8%) paid a factor of 3 
to 30 greater than the land tax (an average factor of 9, median of 5.5); four had “other” ar-




4.2  The determinants of plot tenure status 
 
Inter-enterprise variation in land tenure should reflect the influence of sub-federal policy 
and the tenure status demanded by individual firms. The index that we introduced above 
proxies for the price variation of privatizing plots across different regions. We would thus 
expect it to explain tenure status of responding firms even after controlling for enterprise 
and plot-specific characteristics. Conditional on a given orientation of regional land policy, 
however, certain plot and enterprise characteristics may increase or decrease interest in 
owning its own plot. 
Market liberalization rendered worthless much of the capital inherited from the 
bloated Soviet industrial sector, forcing enterprises to reduce (or discontinue) production 
and (eventually) shed workers. For many, particularly those in densely populated urban 
centers, buildings and land constituted their most valuable assets in the new environment. 
Many (nominal) industrial enterprises, have survived by exploiting their location as well 
the presence of structures that could be quickly converted to alternative uses.  16 In St. Pe-
tersburg, a large optics manufacturer that had employed 20,000 in Soviet times, drastically 
reduced its workforce and in 2008 reported rental income of 20 million dollars from vari-
ous inherited properties. 17
                                                 
14 The pre-privatization plot owners were distributed as follows: federal government 24.7%, regional gov-
ernment 16.5% and municipality 26.6%; the remainder, 32.3%, had not yet been assigned to a specific level 
of government. 
According to one account, there were roughly 350 production 
facilities in central Moscow that in 2004 were “obsolete and absolutely unprofitable … 
[but] many of them [were] being leased out as offices or warehouses … (Maternovsky, 
15 A substantial majority of firms that own their plots report paying a 1.5% land tax rate; 28 pay less, with the 
low being 0.4%. The average of all firms that report a specific rate is 1.4%. 
16 Land re-development costs for light industrial firms, particularly environmental clean-up, are low relative 
to other industrial sectors. Generally, the biggest costs associated with brownfield development are related to 
infrastructure and utilities needed to support commercial and residential uses (Humphries, 2006 ). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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2004).” By another estimate, 40 percent of class B office space in Moscow is located on 
the premises of former industrial enterprises (Egorova, 2006). Since the costs of converting 
office space are lower than that for former shops and industrial space (Egorova, 2006), we 
would expect that industrial firms that inherited office buildings on their production plots 
would be more likely to have privatized their land so as to better secure control over the 
rents that those assets can generate.18
Conversely, we would expect that the presence of social assets on a plot may dis-
courage privatization. A comprehensive survey of large industrial enterprises found that 
housing, medical and daycare facilities have been a “financial burden” to firms (Juurikkala 
and Lazareva, 2006). In 2003, fewer than 5% of general managers per social asset de-




These sorts of stories suggest that the decision to privatize land plots may relate to 
whether various real estate inheritances represent potential assets or liabilities. To the ex-
tent that office buildings represent future revenue streams, conditional on region-level pol-
icy, we might expect their presence to be associated with plot privatization as a means of 
better securing the potential rents that they represent.
   
20
To explore the micro-level determinants of plot privatization more carefully, we 
employ a regression framework, testing the following specification, to investigate the de-
terminants of the land tenure status of the firm’s primary production plot: 
 Similarly, to the extent that social 
assets represent a negative flow of rents into the future, we might expect that enterprises 
would be less likely to privatize their plot if more secure land rights translate into greater 
responsibility for the maintenance of costly infrastructure and services. 
 
  Ti = α + φPi + γEi + ζRi + εi     (1) 
                                                                                                                                                    
17 From www.lomo.ru and author interview with Marina Zvereva, Deputy General Director of LOMO in 
January 2009. 
18 Until April 2006, Moscow factories benefitted from favorable rental rates charged by the mayor’s office; 
they then could generate rents by sub-leasing at higher prices. The willingness of the Moscow government to 
subsidize some rents gave it a great deal of leverage over enterprises. For instance, the Krasnopresnenky 
Sugar Factory was penalized for “unauthorized use of the land” and saw its rent increased by a factor of ten 
(Gerasimova and Lobanova, 2006). 
19 Many managers, however, reported that relations with local officials would worsen should they divest. 
20 The conservative (and, some would say, corrupt) policies of the Luzhkov administration in Moscow made 
it almost impossible to take private ownership of land. Firms there have thus been unable to use land privati-
zation to better secure property rents. As the evidence suggests, however, the policies have not made it im-
possible for firms to use their real estate to generate revenue. William Pyle 
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The dependent variable Ti represents the tenure status of the i
th firm’s primary production 
plot. In our baseline probit model, it takes on the value of one (zero otherwise) if the land 
is owned privately at the time of the survey.  In subsequent models it takes on the value of 
one if the plot was privatized before 2002, after 2002 or if the plot is still held under per-
manent (perpetual) use rights.21
Pi  represents a vector of plot-specific characteristics, including the log of the 
plot’s size (in hectares) and three dummy variables for the presence of different types of 
real estate assets located on it at the time when the enterprise was first privatized: office 
buildings, objects of social infrastructure (e.g., apartments, medical centers and educational 
facilities) and commercial space (e.g., stores, markets or exhibit halls). As we discussed 
above, we would expect the presence of office buildings to be positively related to plot pri-
vatization, whereas the presence of social assets should be inversely related. 
 
Pi also includes a dummy variable for the plot’s location on the edge (as opposed 
to the interior) of the city. We might reasonably expect this location variable to be related 
to plot privatization. Since rents from plots proximate to the city center should be greater, 
we would expect location on the urban periphery to be inversely related to private owner-
ship. Another variable captures whether the plot is near at least two other enterprises. Ad-
ditional plot-specific include binary variables that address characteristics of the plot at the 
time of the enterprise’s privatization: was it attached to the enterprise at the time (as op-
posed to being acquired later)?; was it the only such plot (as opposed to being one of mul-
tiple) attached to the enterprise?; and was it used at full capacity?  
Ei represents a vector of additional characteristics of the enterprise that are not di-
rectly related to its primary production plot. These include (the log of) the number of full-
time employees at the time of privatization, dummy variables for whether or not it is a 
member of a commercial group (e.g., a financial-industrial group, holding structure, etc.) 
and/or government corporation and categorical variables capturing the influence of various 
types of owners (e.g., foreigners, managers, non-managerial workers) on the enterprise’s 
strategic decisions.      
                                                 
21 For the plot-privatized-before-2002 specification, we restrict observations to firms whose capital had been 
privatized prior to that date since land privatization could not precede capital privatization. In the plot-
privatized-after-2002 specification, we exclude observations whose plot had been privatized before that date. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Finally, we control for regional characteristics, Ri, most notably our proxy for re-
gional land policy measured as the ratio of urban residential-commercial land owned by 
firms to that owned by the government and municipalities.22
Table 4 lays out our results.
 
23
We also find that land tenure status is strongly associated with the presence on the 
plot of specific types of real estate objects at the time of enterprise privatization. Firms 
with social infrastructure on their premises (medical centers, apartment buildings or educa-
tional facilities) were 20 percentage points less likely to have privatized their land by the 
time of the survey. On the other hand, privatized firms that inherited office buildings were 
almost 17 percentage points more likely to have privatized their lands by the time of the 
survey.  These results were both highly sensitive to the timing of plot privatization. The 
presence of office buildings robustly explains privatization of land prior to but not after 
2002; and the presence of social infrastructure is a significant determinant of land privati-
zation after 2002 but not before. The former might be understood in terms of expected 
rents. Early on, the severely constrained supply of urban office space for new businesses 
elevated potential gains from securing ownership over land and real estate estates.  As sup-
ply increased – as other enterprises leased out their office buildings and new office space 
came on line – the expected rents from securing ownership of land and real estate assets 
diminished.   
 Notably, our proxy for the region-specific (inverse) 
“price” of privatization – the ratio of urban commercial-residential-industrial land held by 
private firms to that held by the state and municipalities – is strongly associated with the 
private ownership of land at the individual firm level. Where land policy has been more 
progressive at the regional level, firms, as we would expect, have been more likely to pri-
vatize their plots conditional on a large number of plot and enterprise characteristics. This 
result is statistically significant at the 1% level and is robust to the timing of plot privatiza-
tion, explaining it before 2002 – i.e., concurrent to or before the passage of the Land Code 
– as well as after. 
                                                 
22 We also include controls for the city size in which the firm is located and whether or not it is in St. Peters-
burg, one of the two cities that constitute territorial subjects unto themselves. We exclude a control for Mos-
cow location because it perfectly predicts non-private tenure status. The city population variable takes on the 
value of 1-5: 5 for greater than 3 million; 4 for 1-3 million, etc.  
23 A number of observations are dropped because of lower response rates on two questions: the area of the 
plot and employment at the time of privatization. In specifications that drop the former and include the em-
ployment for 2007, the results look quite similar. William Pyle 
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Several firm characteristics are strongly correlated with perpetual use rights over 
the primary production plot. Firms at which foreigners have a greater voice are less likely 
to be holding their land under the this status; but firms at which non-insider Russians exer-
cise more influence are more likely to operate under the old Soviet form of tenure. We also 
observe an association between perpetual use rights and lands categorized as the most en-
vironmentally hazardous. But, in general, most other plot and enterprise characteristics are 
quiet in terms of explaining land tenure status at the time of the survey. 
A number of additional enterprise characteristics, however, are related to the tim-
ing of plot privatization. Those occurring prior to 2002 were associated positively with the 
plot being used at capacity, as well as being “on the firm’s balance” at the time of its (the 
firm’s) privatization.  Plots that were the only one held by the firm at the time of the priva-
tization were 12 percentage points more likely to have been privatized by 2002. 
 
 
5  Motivation for and barriers to land privatization:  
  testing assumptions 
 
The survey allows us to explore in more depth the assumptions underlying the foregoing 
analysis. Our discussion to this point, for one, has taken for granted that, given a choice, 
firms acquire legal ownership over their land so as to increase the strength of their property 
rights. On this basis, we explored the relationship between tenure status and the presence 
of contiguous assets capable of generating rents. But in an environment in which state 
commitment to the rule of law is often open to question, the value of formal title may be 
negligible in terms of the security of property rights. To address this question head on, re-
spondents at enterprises that had privatized their plots were asked the importance of a 
number of possible motives. Table 5 lays them out in order of popularity according to the 
percentage of respondents describing a motive as extremely important (i.e., a 5 on a 1-5 
scale). Responses are grouped according to whether or not the plot was privatized before or 
after the passage of the 2001 Land Code. 
The most frequently cited motive, irrespective of timing, was the promise of more 
secure property rights (обеспечит  большую  защищенносeть  бизнеса). Half of those 
whose plots were privatized before the Land Code’s passage and 71 percent that were pri-
vatized after cited it as an important rationale. Presumably also related to the security of BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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property rights, the two next most popular responses relate to attracting financial support. 
Over half of firms that privatized their plots after 2002 cited access to external lending and 
increased attractiveness of the property to investors as important reasons for purchasing 
their plots. Although these motives were also relatively important in the context of pre-
2002 privatizations, their significance during this period, when financial markets were less 
well-developed, was not as great. We interpret these responses as suggesting that legal title 
to land is indeed valued for the security of property rights that it confers. Whether to in-
crease the confidence of either creditors as to the potential value of pledged collateral or of 
owners and potential investors as to the reduced likelihood of government predation, in-
creased security of property rights appears to be central to the firm’s decision to assume 
formal ownership over contiguous land.  
A second important assumption above was that our land index did indeed repre-
sent the actual inter-regional policy variation that we described. Of course, the fact that we 
found that surveyed firms were less likely to have taken ownership over their primary pro-
duction plot in regions where the index (“price”) of urban industrial land privatization was 
low (high), even after controlling for a number of firm and plot-specific characteristics, 
gives us confidence that the index captures what we have argued it does. But we can ex-
plore this assumption further by looking at survey responses concerning the obstacles con-
fronted by firms that had privatized their plots. In the bottom of Table 5, we observe that 
the most frequently mentioned obstacles included opaque regulations governing land pur-
chases and direct government opposition. Others, such as a lack of the requisite financial 
resources, did not figure as prominently.  
In Table 6, we explore the factors that influence how significant a barrier firms 
considered opaque regulations and outright government opposition. Controlling for the 
same firm and plot characteristics that we did in earlier models, as well as for other per-
ceived barriers, we see that firms located in regions where the index of land privatization 
was high, firms were less likely to characterize opaque regulations and government opposi-
tion as a more important barrier to plot privatization.24
                                                 
24 We control for the sum of the firm’s responses to the other “barrier” questions so as to diminish the likeli-
hood that results are driven by unobserved variation in firms’ willingness to respond with systematically 
higher or lower responses across all barriers. For instance in the government-opposition model, we control 
for the sum of each of the eight other responses; since respondents rank each barrier on a scale of importance 
 Since outright resistance and un-
clear guidelines are two means that sub-federal officials have been known to use to thwart William Pyle 
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the privatization of plots (i.e., to raise the effective price of private ownership), we have 
even more reason to have confidence that our urban industrial land privatization index is 
measuring policy variation across space in Russia. 
Table 6 also highlights some interesting firm characteristics related to having re-
ported greater government-related difficulties in the process of plot privatization. For one, 
ownership structure seems to matter for the degree of official opposition encountered. Per-
haps unsurprisingly, firms with foreign owners were more apt to report government oppo-
sition. Those belonging to a government corporation, however, were less likely to meet this 
sort of resistance. Finally, firms whose plots had been categorized as environmentally haz-
ardous were less likely to report government opposition as problematic. It may well be the 
case that the clean-up required by heavily polluted plots leaves government officials more 
than happy to relinquish ownership. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Our interest in the tenure status of urban industrial land ultimately derives from an interest 
in the potential effects of formal changes in ownership. Do enterprises that own their plots 
behave differently than those that do not? Are they more likely to invest at greater rates? 
Do they have more success in accessing external finance? Are they more apt to sell or lease 
their lands for new purposes and thus promote urban de-industrialization and the adoption 
of land use patterns more typical of modern global cities?  
`These are all interesting and important questions that, we trust, readers will rec-
ognize as not having been adequately explored by researchers. But before they can be ade-
quately answered, it is important to explore the determinants of the surprising variation in 
plot tenure status across firms, cities and regions. To do so, we suggested these differences 
have arisen from decisions made at two levels. First, sub-federal officials have decided 
how quickly and thoroughly to respond to federal privatization initiatives, most notably the 
2001 Land Code. We tested and found support for the hypothesis that they would be most 
reluctant to give up control rights over land when the economic and political costs to doing  
                                                                                                                                                    
from 1 to 5, this variable can take on a value from 8 to 40. A control was also included for whether or not the 
plot was privatized before or after 2002. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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so would be the greatest. Indeed where land values are likely the greatest – and thus the 
opportunity to extract rents are more abundant – privatization has proceeded the slowest. 
We also observe slower rates of privatization where the political costs to regional officials 
of not divesting control rights are relatively low – i.e., where politics are either less likely 
to be dominated by industrial interests, or are less democratic.  
Second, taking regional policy as given, firms’ owners and managers then decide 
whether or not to privatize their plots. Where this exogenous “price” has been set high, 
firms are less likely to “purchase” title of the land, all else equal. But not all firms are 
equal. We hypothesized that firms would be more likely to privatize if their inherited assets 
could generate a stream of positive rents and would be less likely to assume ownership if it 
increased the responsibility for costly inherited assets. We found support for these hy-
potheses as well. Firms that inherited office buildings that could be leased out or sold to an 
expanding service sector were more likely to have purchased their plots. Those with social 
assets, which prior research has demonstrated as being a financial burden, have been less 
willing to assume ownership of their land. 
Our evidence is consistent, in other words, with the proposition that both regional 
officials and industrial firms have made decisions that are sensitive to the magnitude of 
land rents. In regions where we have reason to believe these rents are greater, policies to 
slow the progress of state divestment appear to have taken root. Controlling for regional 
policy, managers and owners of private industrial firms have been most likely to secure 
their rights to these rents if their inherited real estate assets seem to offer lucrative oppor-
tunities in the new environment. William Pyle 
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Figure 5a. Gross regional output per capita and urban industrial land privatization  
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Figure 5b. Urbanization and urban industrial land privatization
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Tables 
 
Table 1  Land owned by firms in “progressive” regions 
 
 
Commercial-residential-ind land in urban settle-
ments     
 
Amount owned by 
firms relative to 











Amount of industrial land 
outside of settlements 
owned by firms relative 





Belgorord  24.9  6.7  26.9  44.1  6 
Vologoda   23.8  4.9  20.6  9.4  -- 
Tatarstan  18.9  10.4  54.9  116.3  15 
Lipetsk   14.8  3.4  22.9  7.3  10 
Novgorod  8.2  1.5  18.2  5.0  4 
Orenburg  8.1  4.2  52  4.5  -- 
Kemerovo  7.4  8.3  111.7  8.6  5 
Tyumen  7.3  2.1  28.8  5.1  3 
Khakasiia   6.4  1.1  17.3  0.0  -- 
Irkutsk   6.4  5.8  91.2  6.8  6 
Perm   6.0  4.1  68.9  9.3  13 
Sverdlovsk   6.0  8.9  149.3  14.7  17 
Novosibirsk   6.0  3.1  51.6  1.2  3 
Tomsk   5.5  0.9  16.3  11.1  8 
Smolensk   5.1  1.2  23.5  20.6  7 
Cheliabinsk  4.8  4.9  102.7  0.4  17 
Leningrad   4.6  1.6  34.5  4.9  -- 
Rostov   4.5  3.6  80.2  10.1  10 
St. Petersburg   4.4  2.8  63.4  --  24 
Kareliia   3.7  0.6  16.1  3.4  2 
RSFSR  3.7  116.4  3133.0  4.4  359 
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Table 2  (Log) urban commercial-residential-industrial land owned by firms relative  
  to that owned by municipalities and government 
 
       
(Log) gross regional product per capita, 1995  -0.244***  -0.272***  -0.268*** 
  (0.091)  (0.099)  (0.098) 
Percentage of population living in cities, 1995  -0.014**  -0.012  -0.014* 
  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Share of regional domestic product from industry and con-
struction, 2000  0.023***  0.024***  0.025*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Transparency (Media-Soyuz)  0.292***     
  (0.101)     
Democracy (Petrov)    0.031**   
    (0.014)   
Democracy (Zubov)      0.032** 
      (0.014) 
       
N  78  77  78 
Pseudo R2  0.3400  0.2724  0,2894 
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Table 3  Characteristics of enterprise and primary production plot by land tenure status 
 
 
Private  Lease 
Perpetual 
use 
Assets on plot when enterprise privatized (or when land acquired 
for use)           
 
Office buildings  89.5    87.1    87.5   
Social infrastructure  33.7  **  42.0    53.6  ** 
Stores, markets or exhibit halls  20.3    12.2  **  23.2   
Characteristics of plot             
Number of hectares  35.1    39.9    344.5  ** 
Only plot “on balance” of enterprise when enterprise priva-
tized (%)  40.1    35.1    25.0  * 
“On balance” of enterprise when enterprise privatized (%)  82.0    78.6    76.8   
Used at full capacity when enterprise privatized (%)  80.7    86.2    80.4   
First category of environmental harm (%)  4.7    6.1    3.6   
Location of plot              
Edge of city  44.2    51.1    53.6   
More than two other enterprises in same part of city  62.8    72.5  *  64.3   
Moscow 
1.2  ***  33.6 
**
*  3.6  ** 
St. Petersburg  7.0    7.6    3.6   
City size (1-5 scale) 
3.0  ***  3.8 
**
*  3.0  * 
Enterprise characteristics             
Employees at time enterprise was privatized  2209.
8   
2199.
9    3156.8  * 
Employees in 2007  1430.
0   
1554.
1    1981.5   
Employees in 2009 (time of survey)  1248.
2   
1368.
5    1588.6   
Years since enterprise was privatized  14.3    14.9    14.4   
Member of commercial group (FIG, holding, etc.) (%)  30.4    34.3    25.0   
Member of government corporation (%)  5.2    3.1    12.5  ** 
Influence of state property fund (0-4 scale)  0.35    0.35    0.53   
Influence of non-management labor (0-4 scale) 
1.35    1.14 
**
*  1.32 
 
Influence of foreigners  (0-4 scale) 
0.45    0.64  **  0.11 
**
* 
Influence of management  (0-4 scale)  2.36  ***  1.78  **  1.91   
Influence of other Russian individuals  (0-4 scale) 
1.47    1.01 
**
*  1.82 
**
* 
Influence of other Russian enterprises  (0-4 scale)  1.17  **  1.56  **  1.41   
Number of respondents  172    131    56   
             
***, **, * difference significant at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively; t-test on equality of means of those 
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Table 4  Tenure status at primary production plot 
  Privatized 
Perpetual 
use 
  At time of 
survey  Before 2002 
+ 
2002 or after 
++ 
 
(Log) urban commercial-residential-industrial land 
owned by juridical relative to that owned by municipali-
ties and government  0.305***  0.139***  0.215***  -0.057 
  (0.078)  (0.035)  (0.070)  (0.035) 
Plot’s assets when enterprise privatized (or when land 
acquired)         
Office buildings  0.168*  0.121***  0.096  -0.037 
  (0.090)  (0.032)  (0.091)  (0.068) 
Social infrastructure  -0.206***  -0.017  -0.211***  0.074* 
  (0.064)  (0.047)  (0.070)  (0.039) 
Stores, markets or exhibit halls  0.102  -0.068  0.151  0.004 
  (0.083)  (0.048)  (0.099)  (0.047) 
Other plot characteristics         
Only one “on balance” of enterprise when enterprise 
privatized  0.059  0.120**  -0.012  -0.017 
  (0.062)  (0.051)  (0.068)  (0.041) 
“On balance” of enterprise when enterprise privatized  0.072  0.093**  -0.041  -0.060 
  (0.086)  (0.044)  (0.073)  (0.055) 
Used at full capacity when enterprise privatized  -0.006  0.086**  -0.067  -0.040 
  (0.078)  (0.042)  (0.092)  (0.048) 
Located on edge of city  -0.068  -0.028  -0.023  0.042 
  (0.083)  (0.050)  (0.086)  (0.039) 
More than two other enterprises in same part of city  -0.046  0.035  -0.095  -0.047 
  (0.071)  (0.048)  (0.061)  (0.038) 
Class I harm category  0.050  0.082  0.008  -0.096*** 
  (0.181)  (0.131)  (0.192)  (0.024) 
(Log) number of hectares  -0.002  -0.023  0.001  0.010 
  (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.015) 
Other enterprise characteristics         
(Log) employees at time of enterprise’s privatization  -0.025  0.008  0.005  0.031 
  (0.039)  (0.025)  (0.042)  (0.021) 
(Log) years since privatized  0.119  0.375***  0.106  -0.076 
  (0.116)  (0.133)  (0.136)  (0.049) 
Member of government corporation  0.130  -0.098**  0.241  0.049 
  (0.145)  (0.043)  (0.177)  (0.094) 
Member of commercial group  0.069  0.065  0.030  -0.043 
  (0.086)  (0.050)  (0.087)  (0.037) 
Influence of government property fund  0.007  0.069***  -0.061  0.019 
  (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.046)  (0.020) 
Influence of foreigners  0.020  -0.003  0.009  -0.086*** 
  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.022) 
Influence of external Russian individuals  0.003  0.018  -0.010  0.036*** 
  (0.025)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.013) 
         
N  285  266  221  285 
Pseudo R2  0.1901  0.2573  0.1683  0.1843 
 
+ If enterprise privatized before 2002;
 ++ if plot not privatized before 2002. Probit models with marginal effects reported. Ro-
bust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, 
respectively. Controls also included for sector, influence of workers, management, Russian enterprises.  Other controls inclu-
ded are described in text. 
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Table 5  Motives for and barriers to privatizing primary production plot 
 






+       
Increased security of property rights  71.1  50.0  *** 
Increased asset value, investment attractiveness   58.9  31.4  *** 
Increased access to credit  53.3  27.1  *** 
Danger rental rate grows faster than land tax  34.4  25.7   
Rental rate greater than land tax  23.3  18.6   
Danger lease modified unfavorably  18.9  15.7   
Danger lease not extended  11.1  17.1   
Barriers
 ++       
Non-transparent regulations governing land purchases  28.6  29.6   
Opposition of officials to sale of land to enterprises  25.3  18.8   
Defining and agreeing on plot boundaries  22.0  14.5   
Inadequate resources, difficulty accessing credit  20.9  20.3   
High cost of completing documents to purchase land  20.8  17.4   
Incomplete process of assigning land to appropriate 
government level 
15.4  20.3   
Government registering rights to land  9.9  18.8   
Unresolved disagreements regarding sub-dividing  8.8  8.7   
Absence of documents conferring rights to land  5.5  7.2   
 
+ Percentage responding 5 on 1-5 scale; 
++ percentage responding 4 or 5 on 1-5 scale. ***, **, * difference 
significant at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6  Barriers to privatizing plot 
 




(Log) urban commercial-residential land owned by juridical relative 
to that owned by municipalities and government 
 
-0.249*  -0.437** 
(0.138)  (0.176) 
Plot characteristics     
Only one “on balance” of enterprise when enterprise privatized  -0.562**  -0.320 
  (0.219)  (0.211) 
“On balance” of enterprise when enterprise privatized  -0.515**  -0.188 
  (0.224)  (0.369) 
Class I harm category  -0.486  -1.705*** 
  (0.389)  (0.610) 
(Log) number of hectares  -0.082  -0.052 
  (0.097)  (0.095) 
Privatized before 2002  0.008  -0.255 
  (0.292)  (0.248) 
Other enterprise characteristics     
Member of government corporation  -0.008  -1.337*** 
  (0.470)  (0.423) 
Influence of foreigners  0.000  0.300*** 
  (0.105)  (0.099) 
Sum of other “barrier” responses  0.121***  0.160*** 
  (0.021)  (0.020) 
     
N  129  129 
Pseudo R2  0.2163  0.2964 
 
Ordered probit models. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level in parentheses. ***, 
**, * significant at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. Other controls included are described in text. 
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